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COMMENTS
TITLE VII SEVEN YEARS AFTER:
A GLANCE AT THE BASIC STATUTORY SCHEME AND
CONTENT OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964 AND THE JUDICIAL GLOSS PLACED UPON IT BY
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On June 19, 1964, after 534 hours, 1 minute, and 37 seconds of fili-
buster,, the Senate passed an amended version of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 which had been passed by the House. 2 It was sent
to the House where it was passed as amended on July 2, 1964.3 The
signing into law on the same day by the President was hailed by many
as a great stride in the civil rights area. At last Congress had acted in the
field of discrimination in employment with the promulgation of a federal
statute that provides relief from a problem which is truly national in
scope and affects the basic fiber of the nation.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 precludes employers, em-
ployment agencies, and labor organizations from discriminating in em-
ployment upon the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
Such discrimination constitutes an unlawful employment practice. 5 In
addition, the Act establishes a five member Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission (EEOC) which has the duty of interpreting the Act and
seeking compliance. 6 An aggrieved party must file initially with the
EEOC who investigates the charge and, after a determination of reason-
able cause, attempts to obtain a voluntary compliance through informal
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.7 All matters in the conciliation
process are strictly confidential.8 If the EEOC fails to obtain compli-
ance within a certain time limit, it must notify the party of his right to
institute a civil suit in federal court.9 The federal court upon finding a
violation has the power to grant appropriate affirmative relief which in-
cludes reinstatement or hiring, with or without back pay.10 In addition,
the court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees.1
'BNA, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 21 (1964).
2110 CONG. REC. 14511 (1964).
8110 CONG. REc. 15897 (1965).
'42 U.S.C. 2000e (1964). Hereinafter the original section numbers of the Act will be
utilized.
-§ 703.
1§ 705; and § 706(a).
7§ 706(a).
1§ 709(e).
9§ 706(e).
10o§ 706(g).
-§ 707(k).
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The Attorney General may institute an action in federal court when
he has reasonable cause to believe that there is a "pattern or practice"
of resistance to the rights granted by Title VII.' 2 In this action, he may
seek injunctive relief or such relief as he deems necessary.' 3 The power
of the Attorney General under the Act will not be considered in this paper.
The main emphasis of the following pages will be upon the contents
of the act itself as developed by recent cases in order to provide an overall
familiarity with Title VII and the rights secured by it.
UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
An unlawful employment practice on the part of the employer is de-
fined as a re'asal or failure to hire; or a discharge or discrimination
against an emj Joyee in relation to compensation, terms, or conditions of
employment; or a limitation, segregation, or classification of employees in
any way which would adversely affect an individual's status as an em-
ployee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
14
Section 703(b) proscribes an employment agency from refusing or
failing to refer for employment, or otherwise discriminating against an
individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
A labor organization commits an unlawful employment practice when
it excludes or expels from membership or otherwise discriminates against
an individual (r classifies its membership or refuses to refer an individual
which affects his status as an employee predicated upon race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.' 5 In addition, an attempt by a labor organization
to cause an employer to discriminate in violation of the Title VII is an
unlawful employment practice. 16
Employers and labor organizations are barred from denying admis-
sion or employnent in an apprenticeship program on a discriminatory basis
as well as any advertising for employment which indicates that the hiring
is on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' 7
Congress 1jas defined an unlawful employment practice to cover a
wide array of relationships in employment. Every element of the rela-
tionship is covered and any individual who comes in contact with an
employer, employment agency, or labor organization in an eml)loyment-
connected rela-ionship has a right to be free from discrimination.:
11§ 707(a).
13§ 707(a).
"§ 703(a) (1); and § 703(a)(2).
1§ 703(e) (1); and § 703(c) (2).
16§ 703(c) (3).
11§ 703(d) ; § 704(a); and § 704(b).
[Vol. 32
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EMPLOYMENT HIRING QUOTAS
Section 703(j) expressly provides that Title VII does not require the
granting of preferential treatment to any individual upon the basis of
quotas.' The literal language of this section does not preclude the grant-
ing of such a preference, it merely states that Title VII does not impose
such a duty.
In Contractors Association v. Schultz'9 the Philadelphia Plan was
attacked on the grounds that such plans conflict with the above mandate
and that they require "reverse discrimination" which is in effect discrim-
ination and contrary to the spirit of Title VII. The district court resolved
the conflict by articulating that the employer was not legally bound to
hire according to the quota. The statute merely requires a good faith
effort and thus there is no discrimination.20 Although the validity of such
"affirmative action" plans has withered Title VII attacks 2 and such
plans are deemed beneficial to social change, the real question as to whether
"reverse discrimination" constitutes discrimination within the meaning
of Title VII has not been adequately resolved.
Some courts have refused to grant affirmative relief in the form of
hire or reinstatement with or without back pay as allowed by section
706 (g) on the grounds that such relief constitutes an unlawful preference. 22
Limiting the power of the courts to order affirmative relief on this basis
is inconsistent with the express terms of the Act and the intent of Con-
gress to grant such power. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v.
IBEW, Local 38,23 correctly interpreted the extent of section 703(j) in
relation to the remedial powers of the federal courts when it stated:
... we believe that section [section 703(j)] cannot be construed as a
ban on affirmative relief . . .
1S§ 703(j) states that Title VII does not require the granting of preferential treat-
ment to any individual ",... on account of an imbalance which may exist with
.respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment
by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classi-
fied by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship
or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons of. such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State
section or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section,
or other area.
1Contractors Association v. Shultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 2 F.E.P. 472 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
All cases, as well as internal cites, will be cited to the FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
CASES (hereinafter referred to as F.E.P.) of the BNA LABOR RELATIONS REFERENCE
MANUAL. See Hanson, The Affirmative Action Requirement of Executive Order 11246
and Its Effect on Government Contractors, Unions and Minority Workers, this issue,
for more discussion of ''affirmative action plans'' similar to the Philadelphia Plan.
0Contractors Association, supra note 19 at 477. The court state " [t]he Plan does not
require the contractors to hire a definite percentage of a minority group. To the con-
trary, it merely requires that he make every good faith effort to meet his commitment
to attain certain goals. . . . It is equally clear that if this plan is properly adminis-
tered it will be a plan of inclusion rather than exclusion.''
"Id. at 477; Joyce v. McRane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D. N.J. 1970).
nDobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 272 F. Supp. 413, 1 F.E.P. 387 (S.D. Ohio 1968);
Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
mU.S. v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 2 F.E.P. 716 (6th Cir. 1970).
1971]
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Any other interpretations would allow complete nullification of
the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In order to effectively curb and extinguish discrimination in em-
ployment, the affirmative remedial and injunctive powers granted to the
federal courts under Title VII must be utilized to their fullest extent.
WHO IS COVERED
EMPLOYERS
An employer who employs 25 or more employees for each working
day in 20 or maore calendar weeks of the current or preceding year and
is engaged in an industry affecting commerce is covered by the prohibitions
of Title VII. " 5 The Act will also apply where there are multiple establish-
ments which separately have less than 25 employees, but when combined
have more.26 The definition of , mployer does not include the United
States, a United States wholly owned corporation, an Indian tribe, a state
or local government, or a bona fide private membership club.
27
EMPLOYMENT AGENCIEs
Title VII covers any employment agency which "regularly" with or
without compensation procures or attempts to procure employees for a
covered employer or attempts to procure opportunities to work for a
covered employer. 28 In determining if the employment agency is covered,
the status of the employer served is determinative. Excluded from the
definition are agencies of the United States or state or local government.
29
Although this appears to exempt a great bulk of employment agencies from
coverage, a further qualification includes expressly the United States
Employment Service and any state or local employment service receiving
federal assistanceeA0 By this inclusion the bulk of employment agencies
are covered.
31
241d. at 720.
-§ 701(b). [ 701(h) defines 'industry affecting commerce" as "... any activity,
business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or ob-
struct commerce or the free flow of commerce and includes any activity or industry
'affecting commerce' within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959." The coverage.of Title VII is broader, both horizontally and
vertically, than the NLRB. The only requirement for coverage is the requisite number
of employees and the requisite "affecting commerce." The self-imposed monetary
standards of the NLRB do not apply to Title VII. In addition, coverage extends to
all types of employers who meet the numerical prerequisite, including hospitals and
agricultural concerns.
21The EEOC has adopted the NLRB's criteria of "interrelation of operations, common
management, centralized control of labor relations and common ownership" in deter-
mining when such multiple establishment is present. EEOC GENERAL COUNsEL'S
OPwnioNs, July 27, 1969. See No. 71-708, 3 F.E.P. 141 (EEOC 1970) (franchise com-
pany is a joint employer under NLRB criteria even though discrimination took place
in the store of an individual franchise owner who employed less than 25).
'§ 701(b).
§ 701(c).
1§ 701(c).
0§ 701(c).
'The United States Employment Service is the largest federal employment agency and
most state employment agencies receive federal funds through unemployment com-
pensation.
[Vol. 32
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A recent case32 has excluded from the definition of employment
agency a newspaper since it is not engaged to a significant degree in this
kind of activity as a profession. Thus, newspapers can publish employment
advertisements under separate "men" and "women" headings even
though this is an unlawful employment practice under the Act.
Another conflict is whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity pre-
vents an individual from obtaining injunctive relief or affirmative relief
under the Act against a state without its consent. Although injunctive
relief presents no problem,33 a district court has held that back pay
constitutes damages and, relying upon United States Supreme Court
authority, that damages against a state are barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.34 Since the Supreme Court authority dealt solely
with case or controversy jurisdiction of the federal courts, the existence of
a specific federal statute granting relief in the form of back pay, to say
the least, raises dire constitutional issues as to the power of Congress
under the Interstate Commerce Clause vis-a-vis the 11th Amendment.
LABOR ORGANINATIONS
A labor organization "... engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce" is covered by the Act.3 5 The actual term is defined broadly to in-
clude any entity associated or related with a labor union from a business
agent to a joint or national council, whose purpose is to deal with employers
concerning the tenure and conditions of employment of employees.
A labor organization is regarded as being engaged in industry affect-
ing commerce if: (1) it maintains a hiring hall for a covered employer
regardless of the number of members; or (2) its members number 25 or
more and it is: (a) certified by the National Labor Relations Board or
Railway Labor Board; (b) recognized by a covered employer; or (c) re-
lated to a covered labor organization by charter, joint interest, or affilia-
tion.36 Thus, a labor organization with less than 25 members is within the
confines of the Act if it maintains a hiring hall or is affiliated with a
national union or joint council.
PERSONS ENTITLED To SEEK RELIEF
Any individual is entitled to seek relief from discrimination in em-
ployment upon the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
United States citizenship is not necessary since aliens within the United
States are entitled to the benefits of the Act.3 7
"Brush v. Newspaper Printing, 315 F. Supp. 577, 2 F.E.P. 811 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
'Anthony v. Brooks, 1 F.E.P. 229 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (sovereign immunity does not
apply to injunctive relief).
3
'Mickel v. ESC, ..-. F. Supp. ..... , 3 F.E.P. 81 (D. S.C. 1970) (sovereign immunity
bars damages against a state in federal court, citing Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S.
311 (1920).
§ 701 (d).
§ 701(e).
11§ 701 (g) & (i).
1971]
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The jurisdictional standards set by Congress in regard to the pro-
hibition against discrimination easily fall within the requiste limits of
"affecting interstate commerce." As stated above, most labor unions and
the more important employment agencies are generally covered. But the
Act excludes from coverage a great majority of employers. In order to
accomplish its goal of completely eliminating discrimination in employ-
ment, the Act should be extended to cover more employers who, as a rule,
are better positioned and more likely to discriminate. It is the small private
business that has less than 25 employees that must be reached if any
attempt to combat discrimination in employment is to have a permanent
effect. One source has estimated that only 260,000 of the 3,300,000 em-
ployers registered with the Social Security System or eight percent will
be covered by the Act. This eight percent employs 29,000,000 of the
73,000,000 persons employed in this country.38 Thus, a little more than
one-third of the employees in America are protected from discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin under Title VII.
Although the enactment of Title VII was a major step in the elimination
of discrimination, coverage of more employers is necessary in order to
fully achieve this goal. There have been attempts to increase the coverage
under Title VII.3
9
DISCRIMINATION ALLOWED
Section 703(e) (1) allows an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization to discriminate where ". . . religion, sex or national origin
• . . is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise..."
The omission o C the words "race " and "color " indicate that discrimination
upon these two basis may never qualify as a BFOQ. The distinction
between race, color, and national origin in this instance becomes very im-
portant.
The justification for the allowance of discrimination in the form of
a BFOQ lies in the balancing of the two competing interests of the em-
ployee and the employer. Congress tipped the scale in favor of the em-
ployer in this case. As will be stated later the burden of showing the
existence of a BFOQ is generally upon the employer.
In additi,n, Section 703(h) allows an employer to utilize a "bona
fide seniority system or merit system" providing different standards of
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or to rely
upon the results of any "professionally developed ability test," provided
neither are intended to discriminate.
"Address by Burke Marshall, then Assistant Attorney General, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, Oct. 16, 1964.
3In November 1970, the Senate approved S.B. 2453 which will extend Title VII cover-
age to employers who have eight employees and labor organizations which have eight
members. In addition, state and local governments are included as employers and the
exemption granted to educational institutions is repealed. 1 BNA LAD. REL. REP.,
75 Analysis 33.
[Vol. 32
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Also, a religious group or educational institution can discriminate
opon the basis of religion in employment. 40 Congress denied the pro-
tection of Title VII to members of the Communist party or any similar
organization required to register with the Subversive Activities Control
Board, 41 and individuals who are required to obtain a security clearance
when one is required by the government. 42 Congress also allowed businesses
near Indian reservations to grant preferences in employment to Indians
43
and employers to pay different wage differentials based upon sex in
accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.
44
TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION
Title VII proscribes discrimination in employment only upon the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. These five types will
be discussed below with emphasis upon recent developments related to
each area.
RACE AND COLOR
Discrimination in employment based upon the color of a man's skin
or the race of human beings to which he belongs is the type of dis-
crimination that prompted the enactment of Title VII. Since this type
touches ever aspect of discrimination in employment and has no areas
or developments which are peculiar to itself, it is too broad to discuss
separately. Most of the current issues and developments involving this
type of discrimination will be discussed later on.
RELIGION *
The regard for religious tolerance has long been a part of our national
heritage. Title VII in keeping with this deep-seated tradition bans
discrimination upon the basis of religion.
A question of major significance in this area is the definition of
religion. The U.S. Supreme Court's construction of "religious belief"
in regard to conscientious objector status will probably serve as a guide.
One EEOC case has so decided requiring only an "intensly personal
conviction" as opposed to membership in an organized sect.
45
The EEOC guidelines require an employer to make reasonable ac-
comodations to the religious needs of his employees unless it creates an
undue hardship on the conduct of his business.46 An undue hardship is
"o§ 702; § 703(e)(2). See McClure v. Salvation Army, . F. Supp ..... , 39 U.S.L.W.
2549 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (Salvation Army protected in discharging one of its officers
in a discriminatory manner).
-§ 703(f).
'2§ 703 (g).
-§ 703(i).
,,§ 703(h).
'No. 71-771, 3 F.E.P. 178 (EEOC 1970). See also McClure v. Salvation Army, supra
note 40.
-29 C.F.R. 1605.1(b) (1971).
1971]
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defined to exist ". . where the employee's needed work cannot be per-
formed by another employee of substantial similar qualifications during
the period of absence of the Sabbath observer." 47 The burden of proving
an undue hardship is upon the employer. 48
In Dewey v. Reynolds49 the collective bargaining agreement required
all employees to work overtime, including Sundays, when requested. An
employee refusing to work on Sundays for religious purposes filed a
grievance, but the arbitration decision was adverse. Following his religious
views he refused to work on Sunday and was discharged. The district
court held that the arbitration procedure clothed the transaction with
state action and that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
required accomodation by the employer. Although the Court of Appeals
reversed for other reasons, it did state on petition for rehearing that to:
coerce or compel an employer to accede or accomodate the
religious beliefs of all of his employees would raise grave constitu-
tional questions of violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.'
It seems beyond a doubt that the court has the power to grant
'appropiate affirmative relief" under Title VII unless the employer
can show that such accomodation constitutes an undue hardship. With
the interjection of the First Amendment complex constitutional issues
arise which creates a host of problems in resolving the propriety of ac-
comodating to the religious needs of the employee. A development of
the ramifications and effect of the First Amendment upon the duties
of employers under Title VII should take precedence in the area of
religious discrimination.
In order to be exempt from the duty to accomodate, the employer
must show an undue hardship. Although there are a few EEOC cases
illustrating an undue hardship,51 the outward limits of this concept
should be developed more fully in the future by the courts, so that em-
ployers will have a secure standard upon which they can rely when deal-
ing with the religious needs of their employees.
SEX
Although discrimination due to sex has been dormant for a period,
it has now blossomed into one of the most active and rapidly growing
aspects of discrimination in employment. Since the prohibition of this
type of discrimination is worded in terms of an individual, it is not
only limited to discrimination rue to femininity, but also includes dis-
crimination upon the basis of masculinity.
5 2
-29 C.F.R. 1605.1(b) (1071).
-29 C.F.R. 1605.1(c) (1971).
"Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 2 F.E.P. 687 (6th Cir. 1970), rehearing
denied, 429 F.2d 324, 2 F.E.P. 869 (6th Cir. 1970).
mid. at 870.
OSee No. 7099, 2 F.E.P. 227 (EEOC 1969); No. 70773, 2 F.E.P. 686 (EEOC 1970).
mRosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775, 1 F.E.P. 709 (3rd Cir.
1969); Local 246 v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 2 F.E.P. 328 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
[Vol. 32
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The EEOC guidelines provide that any stereotyped characterization
or paternalistic view 53 of the sexes, preferences of co-workers, employers
or customers, or the fact that the employer has to provide separate
facilities for the opposite sex unless such cost is clearly unreasonable do
not constitute a BFOQ for purposes of sex discrimination.54
A. Individualized Job Classification
Any attempt to classify job assignments upon an arbitary standard
steeped in the alleged inferiority of women is a violation of Title VII.
In Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co.55 the Court of Appeals, although allow-
ing the employer to maintain his rule restricting females to a 35 pound
weight lifting limit, adopted the EEOC's individualization approach
stating that the employer:
...must notify all of its workers that each of them who desires
to do so will be afforded a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
his or her ability to perform more strenuous jobs on a regular basis."
Generally courts should adopt this individualized approach in deal-
ing with any restrictive requirement that employers apply solely to
women. This rationale of judging a person upon his individual qualities
and potential as opposed to group characterization is a proper approach
towards the elimination of the paternalistic attitude toward women in
employment.
B. Airline Stewardesses
Another area of more than passing interest deals with the airlines
and their deeply entrenched policy of hiring only female stewardesses.
The application of a restrictive hiring policy to males solely is clearly
discrimination based upon sex. Since the existence of a BFOQ is the
main issue, the problem boils down to two considerations: (1) can the
preferences of customers be considered in determining a BFOQ and
(2) is the requirement that the position be filled by a woman reasonably
necessary to the operation of the business? In Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc.57 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the lower court's decision and adopted the EEOC's guidelines forbidding
customer preference as a determination of a BFOQ.55 In addition the
court utilized the business necessity test and concluded that the hiring
"This is referred to as "romantic paternalism."
-29 C.F.R. 1604.1(a)(1) (1971).
'5Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 2 F.E.P. 121 (7th Cir. 1969).
5Id. at 125.
wDiaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.. .... F.2d ...., 39 U.S.L.W. 2580 (5th Cir.
1971).
"Id. The lower court found a BFOQ for hiring women only stating that a preference
on the part of customers is legitimate where it is ". . . related to differences in the
ways in which the work will be performed by persons of different sexes, and the
manner in which such performance will be received by the customer because of such
differences." Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 2 F.E.P.
520, 528 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
1971]
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of members of only one sex will not undermine the business operation
of the airlines. Although there are few cases in this area, this landmark
case is consistent with literal language of the Act as well as its spirit
and policy. Section 703(e) does state that the BFOQ must be reasonably
necessary to the operation of the normal business and the Fifth Circuit
properly applied this mandate in Diaz.
C. Marriage
The EEOC guidelines provide that a rule which forbids employment
of married women, but which is not applied to married men, is dis-
crimination based upon sex.5 9 Originally, the courts refused to follow the
EEOC's interpretation and allowed a policy based on marital status
applicable only to females to be utilized on the grounds that Title VII
only prohibited discrimination upon sex, not marital status.60 Later
cases discarded this superficial distinction between sex and marital status
and held that any differentiation of hiring policies between men and
women based on marital status is sex discrimination. 61 It is not the fact
that the standard is stated in terms of marital status, but the fact that
there is a standard which is applied differently to both sexes. This is
consistent with the policies of the Act, since any differentiation in em-
ployment between the sexes is discriminatory, be it marital status or
wages. The application of a policy terminating employment upon mar-
riage which is fairly applied to both sexes is not violative of the Act
since: (1) the policy is applied uniformly to all employees regardless
of sex and (2) the effect or impact of such policy does not penalize
an individual employee upon the basis of sex, i.e., men tend to become
married just like women.
D. Pre-school Age Children
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,6 2 the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's ruling that a policy prohibiting employees
with pre-school age children, applicable only to women, was not violative
of the Act by stating:
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in reading this section [Sec.
703(a)] a; permitting one hiring policy for women and another for
men, each having pre-school age children.'
The Court emphasized the fact that there existed two different policies
in regards to hiring, one applicable to men and the other applicable
to women, rather than the fact that the policy was phrased in terms
-29 C.F.R. 1604.3(a) (1971).
00Cooper v. Delta Airlines, 274 F. Supp. 781, 1 F.E.P. 274 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Lansdale
v. United Airlines, . F. Supp ..... , 2 F.E.P. 462 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
aLansdale v. Airline Pilots Assn., 431 F.2d 1341, 2 F.E.P. 869 (5th Cir. 1970); Sprogis
v. United Airlines, 308 F. Supp. 959, 2 F.E.P. 385 (N.D. Il. 1970).
"Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.. .... U.S ..... , 3 F.E.P. 40 (1971).
6Id. at 41.
[Vol. 32
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of "pre-school age children." Such disparate treatment between the
sexes in hiring is clearly discrimination upon the basis of sex. Con-
tinuing on, the Court uttered the following in regards to such a policy
limiting women with pre-school age children, applied solely to women,
as constituting a BFOQ:
The existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demon-
strably more relevant to job performance could be a basis . . ."
Allowing a policy which terminates employment or prevents em-
ployment due to the existence of pre-school age children applicable only to
women to constitute a BFOQ raises a complex problem since there appears
to be discrimination within discrimination. The burdening of women with
these obligations and responsibilities is entirely rue to sex and should not
receive any consideration in the determination of a BFOQ. It is hoped
that the courts will became cognizant of this consideration which logic
requires to be considered.
E. Pregnancy and Unwed Motherhood
Complimenting marriage is the topic of maternity leave. In
Schattmen v. Texas Employment Comm.6 5 the court stated the maternity
was a disability physiologically unique to the female sex and an employers
policy of terminating women two months before the expected delivery
date was violative of the Act and the employer failed to show the existence
of a BFOQ. This decision is clearly sustainable, since the effect of
the policy discriminates against the individual on the basis of his sex.
The EEOC has stated recently that:
. . . the foreseeable and certain impact of an illegitmacy standard,
even where an employer attempts to apply it equally, is to deprive
females of employment opportunities.'
This conclusion is supportable even though the policy is applied to
both sexes since the stigma of having an illegitmate child attaches more
to the mother than to the father. It is hoped that the courts will follow the
lead of the EEOC and adopt this rationale.
F. Protective State Laws
One bastion of the citadel of sex discrimination has fallen tumultuously
in the wake of the brouhaha that has arisen in this area. Many states have
passed so-called "protective legislation" regulating the employment of
women. In 1969 the EEOC changed its position and adopted the principle
that such state laws are not a defense to an unlawful employment practice
nor a basis for a BFOQ.6T
"Id.
"Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm.. .... F. Supp ..... , 3 F.E.P. 311 (W.D. Tex.
1971); Accord, No. YAU 9-026, 2 F.E.P. 294 (EEOC).
"No. 71 332, 2 F.E.P. 1016 (EEOC 1970).
6729 C.F.R. 1604.1(b) (2) (1971).
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An early district court decision refused to accept jurisdiction to
determine if Title VII pre-empted the state law relying upon constitutional
validity of such state legislation. 68 In Mengelkoch v. Ind. Comm.,6" the
district court exercised the doctrine of abstention and deferred to the
state courts the problem of construing the state law consistent with Title
VII. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. holding that there
was a substantial Constitutional issue based upon the Equal Protection
Clause and ordered the lower court to decide it. In Krouss v. Sacramento
Inn,70 the California law prohibiting employment of female bartenders
was upheld as valid against Title VII attacks on the ground that the
21st Amendment granted exclusive power to the states to control traffic
in liquor within their borders free from federal interference, and that
pre-emption, therefore, was not applicable.
Although this myriad of constitutional issues clouds the status of
state protective laws, the trend and preferable approach to the problem
is to apply pre-emption and hold such laws unenforceable, since they
-onflict with Title VII.7 1 The answer to the abstention problem is that
there is a substantial Constitutional question predicated upon the Supre-
macy Clause as well as the Equal Protection Clause, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has declared. The 21st Amendment question is
answered on the grounds that it only granted the interstate commerce
power of Congress over liquor to the states, not the protection of the
14th Amendment.
NATIONAL ORIGIN
Discrimination on the basis of national origin, as opposed to race
or color, is differentiated on the grounds of the nationality of one's pre-
decessors. The term relates to the attributes of a person such as language
or cultural background stemming from the nation in which he or his
parents were born or raised.
sWard v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 162, 1 F.E.P. 435 (E.D. La. 1968).
*Mengelkoch v. Ind. Comm.. .... F.2d ...., 3 F.E.P. 55 (9th Cir. 1971).
"Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171, 2 F.E.P. 733 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
7
'Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1 F.E.P. 450 (C.D. Cal. 1968)
(California weight law void); Richards v. Griffith, 300 F. Supp. 338, 1 F.E.P. 837
(D. Ore. 1969) (Oregon weight law unenforceable); Local 246 v. Edison Co., .... F.
Supp ....., 3 F.E.P. 18 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (California weight law pre-empted); Cater-
piller Tractor Co. v. Grabied, .... F. Supp. ,.., 2 F.E.P. 944 (S.D. Ill. 1970) (Illinois
Female Employment Act unenforceable); McCrimmon v. Daley, .... F. Supp ...... 2
F.E.P. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (Chicago city ordinance prohibiting women bartenders
is unconstitutional); Ridinger v. General Motors, .... F. Supp ....., 3 F.E.P. 280 (S.D.
Ohio 1971) (Ohio maximum hour and weight law unenforceable); Kober v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.. .... F. Supp ....., 3 F.E.P. 326 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (Pennsylvania
hour law unenforceable); Garneau v. Raythein Co., .... F. Supp ....., 3 F.E.P. 215
(D. Mass. 1971) (Massaehuetts hour law invalid); No. 608-6654 (CL 6-10-76EU),
2 F.E.P. 78 (EEOC 1969) (State law requiring periodic rest periods for women
invalid); No. CL 7-6-691 (6-6-5767), 1 F.E.P. 911 (EEOC 1969) (Ohio maximum
hours of employment for females not valid); No. YSF 9-056, 1 F.E.P. 911 (EEOC
1969) (Montana eight hour law for women not a defense); and No. YSF 9-120,
1 F.E.P. 918 (EEOC 1969) (California weigh law not a defense).
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The EEOC guidelines 72 state that the following instances will be
carefully scrutinized for possible discrimination: (1) the use of English
in tests where English is not the person's mother tongue or English
is related to the work; (2) a person who is married to or associates
with persons of a specific national origin; (3) a person who is a
member of an organization promoting a national group or who frequents
churches or schools utilized by national groups; (4) a name that reflects
a certain national origin; and (5) exclusion of persons who, as a class,
fall outside national norms for height and weight where such require-
ment is not related to job performance. In addition the BFOQ exception
is to be strictly construed. 73
The promulgation of rules, restricting speaking of foreign languages
or requiring English to be spoken, comprises a developing trend in this
area. In a recent EEOC decision7 4 Spanish-surnamed Americans were
prohibited from speaking Spanish on the premises during both working
and non-working time since the lead girl could not speak Spanish.
Analogizing to NLRB decisions, EEOC held conversation to be a condition
of employment and precluded the finding of a BFOQ due to the broad-
ness of the rule. In another case75 the EEOC found reasonable cause
to believe that the employer discriminated in refusing to hire an otherwise
qualified applicant due to his noticeable accent.
This area cannot be left without mentioning Case No. CL68-12-
431EU.76 Here a Polish immigrant received the brunt of numerous
"Polish" jokes and derogatory remark about his ancestry and other
harrassment such as lighting welding torches around his feet. Charging the
employer with knowledge, the EEOC held that tolerance of ridicule in
this case constituted discriminatory treatment.
As of yet there is no case in federal court reported in this area. This
type of discrimination has suddenly come to the forefront and is pre-
sently in a state of development. It is hoped that the courts will develop
viable principles in this area in order to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
There are a multitude of forms and methods in which discrimination
in employment is manifested. Many of these classifications overlap and
are not easily differentiated. The discussion that ensues will be, limited
to the following four catergories since it is in these four that most of the
major developments have occurred.
-29 C.F.R. 1606.1(b) (1971).
-29 C.F.R. 1606.1(a) (1971).
7'No. 71446, 2 F.E.P. 1127 (EEOC 1970).
"'No. AL 68-10155E, 1 F.E.P. 921 (EEOC 1969).
"
6No. CL 68-12-431EU, 2 F.E.P. 295 (EEOC).
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HIRING AND RECRUITMENT
Any overt conduct on the part of the employer in hiring, from which
it can be inferred that the decision to hire or not to hire is based upon
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, is per se a violation. In
Gates v. Georgia Pacific Corp.,7 7 an employer transferred a less qualified
employee from another department to fill a vacancy for which a qualified
Negro woman had applied. The court found a violation by drawing
an inference of discrimination from the employer's preference of the
less qualified transfered employee.
Even the statistics of the employer's workforce relating to the
number of minority workers may be used as evidence of discrimination.
In Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,7 8 a Negro college student
applied for the position of stockman, but was offered only the position
of lineman. Taking judicial notice of the Negro percentage of the Arkanses
population, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
We hold as a matter of law that these statistics, which revealed
an extraordinarily small number of black employees, except for the
most part as menial laborers, established a violation . .
Although this rationale seems questionable at first, it is both logical
and permissible to infer from the small number of black employees,
especially where such employees are employed only in menial positions,
that an employer in an area where there is a substantial black population
is discriminating in his hiring policy.
Any method of advertising employment openings which entrenches
past discriminatory policies or has the effect of discrimination is violative
of the Act. A policy of hiring at the gate without advertisement or public
announcement of opening is discriminatory, since " [t]he word of mouth
message that vacancies exist in better paying jobs . ..usually goes only
to whites. '"80 The granting of a preference to former employees or
close friends and relatives of the existing work force where such force
is predominately white ". . . is inherently discriminatory.... 81
In addition any hiring policy which appears neutral on its face or
is applied uniformly to all employees is an unlawful employment practice
if its implementation has a discriminatory effect. In Gregory v. Litton
Systems, Inc.,8 2 the court found that a policy of refusing employment to
persons who were frequently arrested was discriminatory against Negroes,
since Negroes are arrested substantially more than whites in proportion
to their numbers. The court further stated that records of arrest with-
T7Gates v. Georgia Pacific Corp.. .... F. Supp ....., 2 F.E.P. 978 (D. Ore. 1970).
"Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.. .... F. Supp., 2 F.E.P. 1017 (8th Cir.
1970).
7Id. at 1021.
'Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp 603, 2 F.E.P. 198 (E.D. La. 1969).
"Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97, 2 F.E.P. 12 (M.D. N.C. 1969).
"Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 2 F.E.P. 842 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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out conviction are not matters of public record and cannot be utilized
for purposes of employment. This implies that a conviction record is
a proper subject for disqualification from employment. Since arguably
Negroes are also convicted of more crimes proportionately,"3 such use
of conviction records is also discrimination due to race. Since discrimi-
nation on the basis of race can never constitute a BFOQ, the reliance upon
conviction records in hiring should not be allowed in relation to Negro
applicants. Whether the courts will accept the logic of this contention
remains to be seen.
UNION CONDUCT
Any overt classification or segregation based upon race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin by a union in its initiation procedure or in any
relationship with the employer is per se a violation. The maintenance
of two locals, one white and one black, the membership of which perform
the same duties in the geographic area, is inherently discriminatory and
merger will be ordered. 4 But the maintenance of two segregated local
lodges within an integrated union is allowable as long as the union, as
opposed to the lodges, is the bargaining agent, both lodges have equal
rights in the operation of the union and they are not used as a device
to discriminate.8
5
Any limitation upon membership or referral which has the effect
of discrimination is a violation. In Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 6
the court enjoined the requirement that a person have four years of
"improver" status, which was limited to sons or close relatives of the
present predominantly white membership, in order to be eligible for
referral stating:
In pursuing its exclusionary and nepotistic policies, Local 53 engagedin a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of race and
national origin both in membership and referrals.'
Where the union has notice that the employer is engaging in unlaw-
ful employment practices and refuses to take affirmative action or
acquiesces in such conduct, the union is treated as ratifying the conduct
of the employer and has committed an unlawful employment practice.8 8
3See R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 51 (1970); E. SCHUR, OUR CRIMINAL SOCIETY
45-51 (1969).
"'Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 536, 2 F.E.P. 433 (E.D. La. 1970);U.S. v. Longstoremen, .... F. Supp ..... 2 F.E.P 1106 (D. Md. 1970).
'U.S. v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 316 F. Supp. 569, 2 F.E.P. 610 (M.D. Cal. 1970).
tHeat & Frost Insulator v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1 F.E.P. 577 (5th Cir. 1969).
11Id. at 579.
'U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F. Supp. 977, 2 F.E.P. 545 (W.D. N.Y. 1970)(no steps taken by the union to alleviate racial discrimination); Moreman v. Georgia
Power Co., 310 F. Supp. 1357, 1 F.E.P. 702 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (union failed to delete
discriminatory provisions from collective bargaining contract); But see Dobbins v.
Local 212, supra note 22 (affirmative action by union to relieve present day effect
of past discrimination constitutes an unlawful preference).
1971]
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The union is also jointly liable with the employer where the effect of any
collective bargaining agreement is discriminatory.
8 9
SENIORITY, TRANSFER, PROMOTION
Section 703(h) allows an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, etc. according to a "bona fide seniority or merit system"
so long as such differences are not the result of an intention to dis-
criminate. The major problem is whether a seniority or merit system
which has the present effect of carrying forward pre-Act discrimination
constitutes a bona fide system. This situation is created where there is
a requirement of departmental seniority and prior to the Act the de-
partments were segregated, or where transfers into other departments
are predicated upon objective tests, but incumbent white employees were
segregated into the department and were not required to take such tests.
The first case to deal with this problem of past discrimination was
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.'0 In this case departmental positions were
predicated upon departmental seniority and prior to the Act whites
were segregated into the better paying departments. The court held
that nothing in 703(h) or its legislative history "... suggests that a
racially discriminating seniority system established before the act is a
bona fide seniority system ... "91
This legislative history is rather ambiguous, because it states clearly
that Title VII will have no effect upon established seniority rights and
e-es examples. identically in point, butthen states that euch s ru r
system may be a subterfuge for discrimination.9 2 The court gleaned from
this history an intent on the part of Congress to not "freeze" or "lock
in" an entire generation of Negro employees ". . . into discriminatory
patterns that existed before the act."93 In the eyes of the court, a present
seniority system maintaining a past discriminatory effect was sufficent
to provide the necessary intent to discriminate so as to fall within the
confines of the proviso of Section 703(h).
Only those employees who were hired prior to the effective date
of the Act under the restrictive seniority plan were held to constitute
the class discriminated against by carrying forward the prior seniority
system. Negro employees who were hired after the effective date of the
Act by the company on a non-discriminatory basis were excluded, since
they did not suffer the present effects of past discrimination. The remedy
ordered allowed Negroes hired prior to the Act to transfer to other
departments on the basis of overall job seniority rather then depart-
mental seniority.
"8ee the cases cited under the heading SENIORITY, TRANSFER, PROMOTION, infra.
OOQuarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 1 F.E.P. 260 (E.D. Va. *1968).
91Id. at 270.
"
2See, statements of Senators Clark and Case, 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
*'Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., supra note 90 at 269.
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Although many may argue over the true legislative intent of this
section, it is presently the law that the carrying forward of the status
quo of past discrimination is violative of VII.94 The Supreme Court has
countenanced this view alsoY5
Since the class affected is comprised of employees who were hired
in a discriminatory manner prior to the Act, a total revision of a seniority
or merit system which has the effect of locking in past discrimination
is not needed. As a general rule, the court only requires that the em-
ployees hired prior to the Act be exempt from such qualifications which
carry forward the effects of past discrimination. 6
This development by the courts that any seniority system, merit
plan, test or any practice which carries forward the effects of past
discrimination constitutes a violation of Title VII is a giant stride in
the attainment of the goal of effectively preventing discrimination in
employment.
TESTING
The utilization of testing, both by employers and unions, is one
form of discrimination that has received much national attention. 7
The Act allows an employer to utilize the results of "any professional-
ly developed ability test," provided it is not "designed, intended or
used to discriminate." 98 The reasonable import of the legislative history
is that Congress was aware of the fact that tests may discriminate against
"U.S. v. Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123, 2 F.E.P. 127 (8th Cir. 1969) (referral
system carrying on effects of past discrimination unlawful); Local 189 v. U.S., 416
F.2d 980, 1 F.E.P. 875 (5th Cir. 1969) (System based on job seniority as opposed
to overall mill seniority is a violation of the Act where employer has maintained
racially segregated lines of progression and labor pools) ; Broussard v. Schluberger
Corp., 315 F. Supp. 506, 2 F.E.P. 874 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (Refusal to allow entry
into craft training progression system without high school diploma is violation where
Negroes without diplomas had been discriminatorily hired into lower paying echleonjobs before imposition of requirement); Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp.
152, 2 F.E.P. 349 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (departmental seniority unlawful where Negroes
are 'locked into" less desirable departments); U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra
note 88 (departmental seniority unlawful when Negrooes are assigned to less de-
sirable departments); and Long v. Georgia Kraft Co.. .... F. Supp ..... 2 F.E.P. 658
(N.D. Ga. 1970) (Utilization of particular job seniority instead of plant seniority
is a violation in regards to pre-Act Negroes who were hired discriminatorily).
"Griggs v. Duke Power Co., .... U.S ..... , 3 F.E.P. 175, 177 (1971) ("Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintined if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior dis.
criminatory employment practices'').
"See, cases cited, supra note 94.
"In TImE, March 1, 1971 at 10 the following appeared: "In order to gain admission
the applicant is asked, aifiong other things, the relationship of Shakespeare to Othello,
Dante to Inferno, Brahms to music, and Whitman to poetry. He must understand
such words as debutante and modiste, know that Dali is a painter and verity is the
opposite of myth. Only after having established such credentials is a man judged to
be qualified under the union rules to become an apprentice steam fitter in New York.
In the past, the test has weeded out 66% of the non-white applicants and only 18%
of the whites-a fairly effective method . . . of preserving the union's whiteness.
On this particular test, one of four an applicant must pass, there is not one question
about the relation of monkey wrench to pipe."
-§ 703 (h).
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certain groups due to their educational background. 99 It thus seems
that Congress intended to allow discrimination in this particular situation
when tests are involved, unless there is a subjective intent on the part
of the employer. In the latter case the use of the test will fall within
the proviso of Section 703(h) and be prohibited.
Assuming that there is no subjective intent to discriminate, the
only remaining question in this area is the meaning of "professionally
developed ability test." The EEOC has interpreted this phrase to mean
that the test must be job-related.1 0
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,1° 1 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on
the issue of job-relatedness in testing. In this case the employer condi-
tioned employment or transfer on the requirement of having a high school
diploma or the passing of a standardized general intelligence test. Neither
requirements were shown to be related to job performance, but both
were shown to disqualify Negro applicants at a higher rate than whites.
The Court of Appeals overturned the lower court's finding of a violation
on the grounds that Title VII did not require employment tests to be
job-related. The Supreme Court perused the legislative history and
giving deference to the EEOC's interpretation concluded that it:
is inescapable that the EEOC's construction of §703(h) to re-
quire that employment tests be job-related comports with congres-
sional intent."
ships or nieans of advancing into higher classifications, it can be argued
that such tests cannot be used at all. Section 703(h) only grants to
employers the right to use such tests. No mention is made of a labor
organization. Since Title VII only prohibits practices and procedures
which discriminate, unions can use tests as long as the tests do not dis-
criminate. But assuming that any test tends to discriminate against
Negroes in relation to their background, it would appear that unions
will discriminate on the basis of race by administering any test. There
have been no cases decided which determine if tests "lock in" or "freeze"
the status quo of past discrimination and there have been no cases con-
sidering whether the exemption under 703(h) applies to a labor organi-
zation. Whether the courts or the EEOC will go so far as to prohibit unions
entirely from using tests depends upon the future. It is certain though that
in the wake of Griggs any test administered by a labor organization must
be job-related.
See, 110 CO NG. REC. 7313 (1964).
1w°29 C.F.R . 1607.3 (1971).
'
01Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra note 95.
-r
21d. at 180. The Court relied upon a subsequent statement of Senators Clark and Case
to the effect that Title VII 11... expressly protects the employer's right to insist
that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job qualifi-
cations. Indeed, the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job
qualification, rather than on the basis of race or color." See, 110 CONG. REC. 7247.
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The requirement that employment tests be job-related is a land
mark development in the area of discrimination in employment. The deci-
sion of the Supreme Court implements the spirit of the Act in striking
down many barriers in job discrimination and effectuates the policy
which should permeate the entire employment relationship. Employees
should be hired on the basis of their ability to perform the job and not
on the basis of extrinsic factors such as race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.
CONCLUSION
In 1960, 40.1 percent of the non-white workforce was employed
in blue-collared positions compared with 16.1 percent in white-collar
positions. In 1965, the year in which Title VII became effective, 41.0
percent of the non-white working force was employed in blue-collared
positions compared with 19.5 percent in white-collared positions. In
1969, the statistics have changed drastically with 42.8 percent of the
non-white workforce in blue-collar position compared with 26.6 percent
in white-collar positions. 10 3 A great portion of this ten percentile in-
crease in non-whites holding white-collar jobs can be attributed to Title
VII. In the seven years since its enactment, there has developed a
substantial repository of case law, refining and developing the effect
and application of the ban on discrimination by race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. It has eliminated many of the barriers which
perpetuated discrimination in this country. It has acclimated the whole
field of employment and labor to the problems and difficulties of dis-
crimination and the effect such conduct has on the national welfare.
Title VII has effectively limited discrimination in the employment
areas covered by it. Except for the ineffectiveness of the EEOC to
seek voluntary compliance, Title VII has successfully performed the
task for which it was created. But in order to permanently eradicate
discrimination in employment, the coverage of Title VII must be extended
to a greater portion of the employment scene. In addition, EEOC should
be armed with a panoply of powers to compel compliance. Whether such
measures are taken to include more employers and to make the EEOC
more than "a poor enfeebled thing" depends upon the fortuities of the
future.
RONALD A. BENDER
113BNA LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1970, at 398 (1970).
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